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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the hypothesis of differentiated growth in the 
municipalities of Colombia which receives rents from exploitation of non-renewable 
natural resources in comparison with the rest of the country. A specific strategy is to 
estimate the empirical evidence for the producers regions of coal and oil and also use 
techniques related to impact evaluation, specifically the difference – in difference 
estimator (diff-in-diff) which compares the evolution of the economic activity into the 
regions affected by the royalties’ source of rents with the unaffected ones. An important 
aspect of this assessment is the legislation based on constitutional guidelines, 
represented in the law No 141 of 1994, which state the main structure to capture, 
distribute and invest royalties’ rents. This point of reference is important in terms of 
evaluate impact, before and after the event.  
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1. Introduction.    
The political constitution of Colombia in the article 332 and 366 states that “Colombian 
state” owns the subsurface and non-renewable natural resources and  the beneficiaries of 
royalties will direct local authorities in which natural resources are exploited, as well as 
sea and river ports. 
Following the constitutional guidelines, the law 141 of 1994 creates the structure to 
liquidate, distribute and use the total amount of royalties generated by all the non-
renewable resources produced in Colombia. Even though, this legislation was modified 
with law 756 of 2002, specifically in the liquidation for direct beneficiaries, the 
structural change is associated to law 141, which was a radical break in the pattern of 
management, especially in the issue related to the importance given to basic needs as a 
major goal of investment to generate local development.  
The goal of this article is explore the relationship between economic activity, measured 
as the quantity of taxes collected of industry and commerce activities, and royalties 
associated to the oil and coal activity, which chain of value since the production to the 
transport and final utilization, in theory has backward and forward linkages that 
generate local and regional development.  To estimate this connection, difference in 
difference model (Diff in Diff) is used to identify the impact of this extraordinary 
resources over municipalities affected compared with the unaffected ones.  
The findings states more questions than answers since there is no evidence to connect 
local development to royalties resources and if a weak relationship is accepted, the 
relation could be negative, having a negative impact over the local economic activity.  
This document is divided into seven sections including this introduction. The second 
part briefly describes the guidelines of the law 141 of 1994 and Act 756 of 2002. The 
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third party makes a literature review of local economic development and the 
relationship with non-renewable natural resources. Subsequently, follow methodology, 
data, and results. Finally a discussion is raised as a form of concluding remarks.   
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2. Law of royalties in Colombia.  
Following the constitutional guidelines, the law 141 of 1994, generate the legislative 
structure of liquidation, distribution and use of royalties Colombia. This law gets 
modifications with law 756 of 2002, essentially in the liquidation part.   
The liquidation of the amount of resources depends on the specific product: Oil (20%), 
Coal (Production less than 3 tons -5%- and more than 3 tons -10 %-) and others as 
Nickel, Iron and Copper, Gold And Silver, Platinum, Salt, Limestones (modified by law 
757 of 2002). However the scope of this discussion is related to what amount of total 
resources belongs to government (government take and state take) and the creation of 
the optimum oil contract which give incentives to private party to explore and develop 
while the government capture the maximum rent.  
Distribution of royalties basically is divided in two branches: indirect and direct. The 
indirect way is related to a fund that manages a part of total amount of resources to be 
distributed in all the regions of Colombia:  The National Royalties Fund (NRF). And the 
direct way is concentrated on the producers and the other participants in the distribution 
chain.  
The resources of NRF are centralized and delivered to municipalities through projects of 
local investment, presented by local authorities and approved for a board at NPD 
(National Planning Department: Administrator of fund). The resources of NRF have a 
great quantity of specific issue of investment: more than 20 destinations that create low 
flexibility in the use (DNP, 2008, p. 60). Furthermore, the utility of the fund, in terms of 
generation of projects which impact local development, had been controversial. In fact, 
there is a huge amount of resources sub utilized, generating interest in the financial 
system, but that cannot be distributed at all abroad the country.  
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The direct royalties, has a defined structure of distribution in function of the 
characteristics of the product (oil, coal, nickel, gold, etc) and territorial entity (producer, 
port, among others). In relation with coal and oil, the rules of law 141 are the following:  
Table 1: Oil Royalties distribution. 
Entity 
Production less to 
20,000 BPMD (%) 
Production more to 
20,000 BPMD (%) 
Producers Departments 47,5 47,5 
Producers Municipalities   25,0 12,5 
Ports Municipalities  8,0 8,0 
National Royalties Fund 19,5 32,0 
Source: Law 141 de 1994 (modified by law 756 of 2002) 
Table 2: Coalroyalties distribution. 
Entity 
Production less to 3 
tons (%) 
Production more to 
3 tons (%) 
Producers Departments 45 42 
Producers Municipalities   45 32 
Ports Municipalities  10 10 
National Royalties Fund 
 
16 
Source: Law 141 of 1994. 
In terms of use, the law establishes that the 100% of the resources must be delivering in 
“priority projects related to local development plan” in municipalities and departments. 
But, the investments made by local authorities according to 15 Article are conditioned 
to achieve the minimum coverage, specifically in the fields of environmental sanitation, 
education, health, electricity, water and sewer. If the territorial entity doesn’t 
accomplish this requirement, the law forces to invest a minimum of these resources to 
reach coverage’s (See table 3).  
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Table 3: Legal rules to invest royalties. 
DEPARTAMENTS 
 
MUNICIPALITIES 
Law 141 of 1994  and 756 of 2002 
 
Law 141 of 1994 and 756 of 2002 
100% to invest in priority 
projects related to local 
development plan.  
90% Projects of investment 
 
100% to invest in priority 
projects related to local 
development plan.  
90% Projects of investment 
5% Technical intervention 
 
5% Technical intervention 
5% Financial expenditure 
 
5% Financial expenditure 
Law 756 change the investment to reach 
minimum coverages: From 50% to  60% 
 
Law 756 change the investment to reach 
minimum coverages: From 80% to 75% 
 
Table4: Minimun coverage. 
 
Minimun coverage  Percent 
Higest infant mortality 1 
Poor healt 100 
Basic education 90 
Safe Drinking water 70 
Sewerage 70 
Source:  National Planning Department (2008) 
To summarize, the law 141 of 1994 create a strategy to guarantee, through the resources 
of royalties, the complete coverage in basic public services. If a territorial entity 
achieves the goal in coverage, the law authorizes the use or resources in other issues 
included in the local development plan.  
Following the conditions and scope of the law, its important now proceeds to evaluate 
this strategy of investment in terms of economic activity.  
  
Source: Elaborated by the author, based on laws 141 of 1994 and 756 of 2002.  
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3. Literature review: Resource – dependence, local economic development. 
The nonrenewable natural resources and their use have been cause of many discussions 
around management to local and national level.  The literature identified two 
contradictory positions: the first about the resources dependence and the second about 
endowment of natural resources. As, many studies have founded a negative relation 
between the economic growth and the resources dependence, on the contrary, a positive 
relation with the endowment´s resources. This discussion was proposal by Innis (1956) 
and Mackintosh (1964), it means, generally exist academics whose think that mineral 
resources are strategies and basis to achieve a high level of economic development, an 
alternative view is the skepticism about the natural resources benefits.  
Initially, Sachs and Warner (1997), consider that the economies with a wide endowment 
of natural resources tend to growth slower than economies which don’t have ones; it 
means, that they identified this phenomenon like “natural resources curse”, but even, the 
evidence indicate that;  the more dangerous resources to the economic growth are the 
minerals and the petroleum. Under the same line of investigation, Auty (2001), consider 
that natural resources generates a false sense of security; his evidence showed that in 
natural resources abundance economies exist a interest groups which slow the economic 
reforms and therefore the economic growth. 
After that, Ross (1999) argued that:  natural resources abundance economies have low 
technology levels, therefore this countries are attractive to the foreign investment, in 
order to exploit the natural resources as oil, petroleum, coal, etc., as well as, increasing 
the level of international reserves and generate additional incomes for the government 
without affecting the tax burden to society.   
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Some authors identified the natural resources curse with the Dutch Disease theory was 
developed in the 1970’s to explain economic difficulties the Netherlands had to face 
after the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea. At the time this phenomenon 
generated a Dutch currency appreciation and a loss of international competitiveness, 
according to Lederman and Maloney (2007), further increase the relative prices of 
tradable goods, compromising investment and growth rates. 
According to the literature review of natural and mineral resources, these affect the 
processes of local development, specifically the Economic sector, according with Desai 
(2003), the unearned resources by some local authorities have encouraged tax laziness 
and have generated interest conflicts on the capture of them, Voracity - Effect.  
Furthermore, economic theory suggests that the mineral resources encourage the 
process of local economic development (LED). It means, through exploitation of 
mineral resources, the welfare level of a community can be raised, given the productive 
structures and characteristics of each territory. According to Barquero (2000) this 
welfare is increased if exist a production structure able to generate scale economies, 
through the use of available resources and the introduction of innovation. 
Among explanations of Stöhr (1985), the endogenous local development give an 
important role to companies, organizations, local institutions and the civil society in the 
structural changes and economic growth process. It means, exist integration between the 
political, social and economic process in the society, finally it´s important to add that 
LED can generate higher economic growth given the ability of areas to reduce 
transaction costs and generate scale economies. 
Based on the theories about the Local Economic Development (LED), in the case of 
Colombia Perry and Olivera (2010) discussed, the economic growth of oil and Coal 
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producing departments, through the analyze of impact with the non receptors royalties 
departments, they founded: firstly that oil and coal production have presented a positive 
and significant impact on the municipalities’ economics development levels, besides a 
positive impact of the coal production in the economic development of departments , in 
contrast a negative relation with the oil production.  
They used five indicators of institutional quality; in addition, to the municipalities exist 
only one datum of GDP per capita for 2002, it means they results are based on cross 
sectional data.  
Moreover, Valdés (2008) identifies four issues related with  the resources from the 
royalties, those are: the Inequality and concentration of resources, low impact and 
results with respect to the minimum coverage as well as a high degree of dependence 
royalties and a low level of taxation and sustainable development, besides institutional 
weakness, and finally the low transparency in the  use of the royalties, the author 
proposes to increase the resources of NRF, in order to have a major control in the  
royalties received by the municipalities. 
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4. Methodology.  
An empirical evaluation aims to identify the change in economic activity as a result of 
an increase in the amount of resources associated with royalties from coal and oil. This 
measurement is performed before and after the law of royalties in the year 1994. Of 
course, the law is considered an exogenous event, which change the pattern of 
distribution of these resources, from the point of view of regional distribution 
(departments and municipalities) as well as the sectors concerned (priority to basic 
services). 
To perform this evaluation is used an estimator DIF and DIF, which compares the effect 
of the event on a group called "treatment group" with the performance of those who 
were not affected. In this case we compare the effect on economic activity, measured as 
the change in the collection of the tax on industry and commerce, of municipalities with 
oil and coal royalties to those who are not receiving any of the above. This is done by 
comparing the effect before and after the law 141 of 1994. The empirical strategy used 
to identify this pattern takes two ways: binary and non binary. 
4.1.Binary strategy 
We performed a simple impact estimation through DIF and DIF estimator in the fol 
lowing model: 
                              ) (1) 
                     (2) 
 
itY is the rate of growth of industry and commerce tax per capita in the municipality   for 
period  , with a window     before the law 141 (1985 - 1995) and     after 
treatment (1996 - 2006).    is a variable dummy to differentiate municipalities with oil 
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and coal (    ) from the remaining (    ).    is the impact of the program given 
that is the difference between the means of each group. (Bernal and Peña, 2011, p. 76) 
The estimator DID and DIF seeks to isolate the effect of treatment group on the variable 
and as a panel, controlling a large proportion of unobserved characteristics. 
4.2.Strategy No Binary 
The empirical strategy that is developed is based on a binary NO treatment (Slaibe, 
2009), focusing not only on the effect per se, but also the size of the treatment: that is, 
the amount of royalties per capita delivered to each municipality. Following Slaibe 
(1999) to implement the DIF and DIF estimator we have the nextregression model 
structure: 
               
     
        (2) (3) 
itY is the rate of growth of industry and commerce tax per capita in the municipality i for 
period t.   is a time dummy variable, if the municipalities is observed after the 
treatment (t=1) (window t = 0 before the law 141 (1985 - 1995) and t = 1 after treatment 
(1996 - 2006));     is a dummy for eligible municipalities equals to cero if the 
municipality i belong to the treatment group (j = T) and cero if belong to control group 
(j = C).   
 
is a dummy variable for t=1 and j = T.  
Taking the first difference to eq. 2 we have:  
                   
          (4) 
Equivalently, and point out that jt =1 if and only if iX > 0                            
                  (5) 
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The constant 1  shows the possible changes in the pattern of growth of industrial and 
commercial tax for the full sample (t = 0, t = 1).  is the cumulative royalties per capita 
transferred to municipalityi from 1996 to 2006.  measures whether the amount of 
royalties have a significant impact on local economic activity. Taking other factors that 
affect the growth of local economic activity, the exercise includes an important resource 
of local governments that is the General System of Participations (GSP). The SGP is 
transference of Central National Government (CNG) to entity territorial’s in order to 
give financial support to local administrations. In small municipalities which also are 
producers of oil and coal, the royalties and SGP is the only one option to finance 
investment in local development projects.  
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5. Data.  
Colombia has 1103 municipalities distributed in 32 departments. The fiscal data of local 
government used in this exercise is collected by the National Planning Department 
(DNP). One problem to construct the database is the absence of information, especially 
when is a municipality in a remote area in the decade of the eighties. Also, there is 39 
municipalities that doesn’t exist before 1996, so it`s impossible the evaluation. After the 
filter, the local databasefor the estimations is of 948 municipalities. (Data related to 
education, infrastructure of roads and other indicators filter the database until 600 
municipalities).  
The data is estimated in local currency with constant prices of 2010. The table 5 
summarizes the principal information of database, pointing out the enormous variability 
in royalties revenues among the municipalities.  
Table 5: descriptive statistics (Millions of pesos) 
 
Source: authors' calculations 
The municipalities that receive the major portion of royalties resources are concentrated 
in the region of the eastern plains (Departments of Casanare, Meta, Arauca) and 
Atlantic coast (Cesar y Cordoba). From top ten, just one of the municipalities is coal 
producer (La jaguar de Ibirico), and other is a port municipality (Cartagena). The 
remaining are oil producers. The per capita distribution of royalties is concentrated in 
the regions of eastern plains, Atlantic coast and also on the region of big Tolima 
(Tolima and Huila departments) (See tables 6 and 7).  
Municipal statistic #Observations Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Growth rate Municipal industry and commerce tax (1985-1995) 948 0.2690168 0.450032 -0.4303527 2.916517
Growth rate Municipal industry and commerce tax (1996-2006) 948 0.3659187 0.5673798 -0.4193281 2.973155
Difference (1996 - 2006) to (1985 - 1995) 948 0.0969019 0.6985494 -2.685258 3.403508
Royalties (1996 - 2006) 226 0.1145461 0.3414309 5.12E-07 3.598128
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Table 6: Top 10 municipalities benefiting from royalties in Colombia from 1996 to 
2006 (Millions of pesos) 
 
Source: authors' calculations 
 
Table 7: Top 10 municipalities benefiting from royalties in Colombia (Average from 
1996 to 2006, Millions of Pesos Per Capita) 
 
Source: authors' calculations 
 
It’s necessary  point out that although the law was approved in 1994, the fiscal accounts 
of municipalities began to receive resources since 1996. For that reason, the year 1996 
is the watershed.  
  
Department Municipalities Royalties 96 - 06 %
Casanare Aguazul 50,219.54                        6.66%
Arauca Arauca 38,984.38                        5.17%
Bolivar Cartagena 33,125.85                        4.39%
Casanare Tauramena 29,636.28                        3.93%
Huila Neiva 26,774.72                        3.55%
Meta Villavicencio 23,631.96                        3.13%
Meta Castilla la Nueva 23,250.54                        3.08%
Santander Barrancabermeja 20,889.00                        2.77%
Cordoba San Antero 18,388.67                        2.44%
Cesar La Jagua de Ibirico 17,683.39                        2.35%
Suma 282,584.32                     37.48%
Otros 471,425.01                     62.52%
Total 754009.3262 100.00%
Department Municipalities Royalties 96 - 06
Meta Castilla la Nueva 3.598                         
Casanare Tauramena 2.072                         
Casanare Aguazul 1.958                         
Casanare Orocue 1.088                         
Tolima Yaguara 0.914                         
Bolivar Cantagallo 0.824                         
Cesar La Jagua de Ibirico 0.801                         
Cordoba San Antero 0.754                         
Casanare Mani 0.733                         
Huila Aipe 0.696                         
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6. Preliminary Results 
When looking at some statistics described in the control group and treatment before 
intervention it shows pre-existing differences (significant at 1%) (See table 8). 
Therefore it’s important the use of DIF and DIF estimator to avoid this bias.  
Table 8: Mean comparison test.  
 
 
Source: Source: authors' calculations 
 
6.1.Binary strategy  
Table 9 shows the results for equation 1: it shows that the variable dummy D is not 
significant to explain thedifferences of growth of industry and commerce tax,among the 
periods 85-95 y 96-06. On the other hand, the SGP is significant (1%)  
Table 9: results with independent variable “dummy”.  
 
 
   Source: authors' calculations 
 
 
Group Observations Average Standard Deviation t_statistic
Control 722 0.2362949 0.0158274 -4.1444**
Treatment 226 0.3785658 0.0347708
** 1% significant
Estimates coefficients (Eq. (1)) P>|T|
Constant (β0) -0.1306073** (0.0462698) 0.005
D -0.760254 (0.0523203) 0.147
SGP 0.7779122** (0.1215261) 0.000
R-Squared 0.0420
Significance F(k,M-k) 21.65** 0.000
# total observations 948
# observations control group 722
# observations treatment group 226
White s´ robust standard deviations in parenthesis
** 1% significant
* 5% significant
OLS
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6.2.Strategy No Binary.  
Table 10 shows the results for equation 3: it shows that the cumulative royalties per 
capita transferred to municipality i from 1996 to 2006 it’s not a significant variable to 
explain the differences of growth of industry and commerce tax, among the periods 85-
95 y 96-06. On the other hand, the SGP is significant (1%) 
Table 10: The impact of royalties on municipal economic activity: Strategy No binary. 
OLS results. 
 
 
    Source: authors' calculations 
 
This weak relationship between tax of industry and commerce and royalties per capita 
can be supported by the Graph1, where it’s difficult describes an association. 
This pattern could be explicated by the great dispersion of differences of growth of 
industry and commerce tax, especially in municipalities with small royalties per capita. 
So, if this is the case, it’s interesting asses the behavior by segments of the distribution 
in the differences of growth of industry and commerce tax. The table 11 shows, the 
results for quartiles of distribution, finding that the result are the same: the cumulative 
royalties per capita transferred to municipality i from 1996 to 2006 it’s not a significant 
Estimates coefficients (Eq. (2)) P>|T|
Constant (β0) -0.1558165** (0.0446328) 0.001
Royalties per capita -0.1997194 (0.1312252) 0.128
SGP 0.8175523** (0.1240016) 0.000
R-Squared 0.0420
Significance F(k,M-k) 21.76** 0.000
# total observations 948
# observations control group 722
# observations treatment group 226
White s´ robust standard deviations in parenthesis
** 1% significant
* 5% significant
OLS
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variable to explain the differences of growth of industry and commerce tax, among the 
periods 85-95 y 96-06, trough different segments of the distribution of the last variable.  
Graph 1: OLS prediction.  
 
Source:  authors' calculations 
 
Table 11: The impact of royalties on municipal economic activity: Strategy No binary. 
Results by quartiles. 
 
 
Source:  authors' calculations 
-4
-2
0
2
4
0 1 2 3 4
Percapita Royalties Average 1996 - 2006
Linear prediction Growth tax industry and commerce
Quartiles Estimates coefficients (Eq. (2)) P>|T|
Constant (β0) -0.2715307** (0.043304) 0.000
Royalties per capita -0.2945187 (0.296866) 0.321
SGP 0.3881698** (0.1356758) 0.004
Constant (β0) -0.1636245 (0.022899) 0.000
Royalties per capita -0.2520502 (0.247956) 0.310
SGP 0.6400558** (0.089468) 0.000
Constant (β0) -0.111524** (0.047247) 0.018
Royalties per capita 0.0327157 (0.176776) 0.853
SGP 1.348352** (0.125212) 0.000
Bootstrap standard deviations in parenthesis.
** 1% significant
* 5% significant
q25
OLS
q50
q75
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The Graph 2 shows the weak relationship between differences in growth of industry and 
commerce taxes and royalties per capita, by different segments of distribution of the 
taxes.   
Graph 2: Prediction by quartiles.   
 
Source:  authors' calculations 
 
  
-4
-2
0
2
4
0 1 2 3 4
percapita royalties average
Linear prediction 25 Linear prediction 50
Linear prediction 75 Growth tax industry and commerce
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7. Discussion  
The extraction of oil and coal is a temporary source of revenues. This activity must find 
a replacement in the medium and long term to generate new resources for the local 
development. Realizing the assessment, the royalties seemingly has not a relationship 
with local economic activity. 
The inevitable question is ¿Why the royalties doesn’t have an impact on the local 
economic activity?  The answer comes from different hypothesis associated to 
institutional weaknesses, corruption and rent seeking, etc.  Therefore, an extension of 
the model it’s important,with the inclusion of other variables that can capture this 
behavior, which depends on the data available and the cost in terms of number of 
municipalities included in the sample.  
However, this kind of approach not recognize the value of other indicators of human 
development, that could be improved with the important amount of resources directed to 
accomplish minimum coverage’s in Poor health, Basic education, Safe Drinking water, 
Sewerage, etc.  
It’s also important identify the characteristics of SGP in contrast to royalties resources 
to identify the reasons of SGP impact in terms of economic activity.   
The assessment of impact of law 141 of 1994 it’s not associated with local economic 
activity. The objectives of the law, was connected to reach certain levels in human 
needs, but this cannot be related to industry and commerce, at least in the short term. 
Variables as education and health, could impact the economyin the medium and long 
term. 
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